This paper seeks to do a number of things. First, to give an account of the emergence of social capital as a very prominent element within policy discourse related to concerns with social exclusion and social inclusion. Second, to explain what is meant by the term social capital and describe its components and the forms it can take at the individual and collective or community level. Third, to show how social capital is linked t o neighbourhood renewal goals such as community empowerment and to urban policy goals such as community cohesion. Lastly, to explain why the current Government is so keen on social capital, exploring its links to Third Way ideology, the objective of 'joined-up policy' and the broader aim of 'democratic renewal'.
with the incidence of poverty, and that something can be done about it. Unlike poverty or deprivation, the assumption is that the negative state of exclusion is not simply transmitted in a fatalistic way across the generations.
Social exclusion is also about disconnection from mainstream society, in terms of distance, experience and aspiration: in Mulgan's words "it defines better than poverty a situation in which large sections of the population are, in effect, cut off from qualifications, jobs and safe environments" (op. cit., p.260). Thus, social exclusion highlights a lack of opportunities or prospects for the future. As Oppenheim says, social exclusion "is about the processes which lead people to being marginalised from the mainstream" (1998, p.13 ).
Social exclusion is relational in a number of ways. It highlights the importance of an area's relations with other areas and with organisations and institutions. For
Atkinson, social exclusion can be more about groups and communities than individuals, for "people become excluded because of events elsewhere in society" (Atkinson op.cit. p. 7) . In Kleinman's terms, "If someone is excluded, there is someone else -an individual, a group of people, an institution or a market -who does the excluding" (op.cit., p.9). Part of the analysis and policy attention then focuses upon institutional processes and how individuals, communities and places are treated by others.
Whilst social exclusion has been the fulcrum on which policies for tackling inequality and poor areas have been balanced, it also neatly shifts the focus away from poverty, the economy and jobs towards 'softer' issues. Individuals and communities come to the fore in two ways. Firstly, the earlier poverty lens "makes [problems] … appear primarily material when they are often as much about skills and cultures" (Mulgan op.cit. p.260) . Oppenheim suggests that the impacts of exclusion are often psychological, including loss of status, power, self-esteem and expectations (1998, p.15) . This perspective on exclusion implies that, amongst other things, the Government can help people to help themselves through social, educational and training programmes.
Thus, observers have noted that social exclusion (perhaps especially area-based exclusion) opens up a wide agenda for government (e.g. Levitas 1998) . If social exclusion is the problem, the aim in tackling it is to achieve social inclusion. This social exclusion-to-social inclusion agenda has two distinct advantages for the Government. It provides a potential route to achieving coherence across government programmes, so that all parties can see that their efforts are contributing to an overriding objective. Furthermore, by defining social inclusion broadly to embrace the economic, social and political, the modernisation of local government and public services which New Labour wishes to pursue becomes necessary to the achievement of social inclusion which embraces a strong element of participation in political processes.
After several years of problem analysis we have moved into the era of delivery, most notably after Labour's second successive electoral victory. Once policies for the regeneration of deprived communities and neighbourhoods began to be set out in detail, the dialogue seemed to shift away from social exclusion and economic development towards social capital. Kleinman (1988) for example, argued for a shift from 'hard' to 'soft' goals in urban regeneration:
"…it is now becoming clear that in obtaining [economic] outcomes, 'social' factors such as family structure and individual self-esteem, and personal characteristics such as punctuality, reliability and attitude are of equal or greater importance than 'economic' factors …. In other words, 'social capital' is as important to economic development as economic capital." (1998, p.13) .
Whilst not necessarily agreeing with Kleinman that the social focus of regeneration has eclipsed the employment and economic instruments and goals, his reflection on the rise of the 'soft' goals agenda is confirmed by others (e.g. Hall and Hickman 2002) . Tiesdell and Allmendinger (2001) describe New Labour's Third Way approach to neighbourhood regeneration as including:
"…greater recognition of the concept of 'social capital', in the form of local partnerships and bottom-up approaches and more generally in strategies, policies, and initiatives that integrate the 'people and communities' with a 'bricks and mortar' dimension" (p.921)
Having seen how social capital has arisen as a means to the end of social inclusion and as a way of tackling social exclusion, the next section considers social capital as a multi-dimensional phenomenon which operates at different levels. Social capital is also seen to have downsides as well as upsides, and our knowledge of how it operates is recognised to be lacking. Despite the level of ignorance and complexity surrounding the concept, the third section of the chapter shows how social capital has emerged as a key element of both regeneration and urban policy, allied to agendas of community self-help and social cohesion and to goals of reducing crime and antisocial behaviour, improving services and stabilising communities. The penultimate section explores the reasons why the Government is so attracted to the concept of social capital, highlighting its fit with New Labour's Third Way political philosophy and the attractive prospect of achieving multiple outcomes from social capital ranging from better health to a healthier democracy. Finally, in the conclusion to the chapter, some of the dangers of such a strong reliance on social capital in public policy are considered.
Social Capital: Of Bonds and Bridges
Social capital has been described by Fine as "a sack of analytical potatoes" (2001, p.190) . He says, "what is striking about social capital is not only the extent of its influence, and the speed with which this has been achieved, but also its ready acceptance as both analytical, empirical and policy panacea" (p.189). Social capital is the "missing link" that can explain any aspect of social, cultural or economic (under)performance, across time and place (ibid., p.190) .
Perhaps social capital is a turn-of-the-millennium phenomenon, since two of its most prominent and recent proponents published their major works on the issue around the turn of the century. In 1999 Francis Fukuya ma published his book on how to reconstruct social order and recover from the "great disruption" of rising crime, declining families and decreasing trust which had set in since the 1960s. In his view, modern post-industrial societies will have an increasing demand for social capital, but should nonetheless be able to meet the demand through the actions of private markets and governments. In 2000, Robert Putnam published his book on the decline of civic America entitled Bowling Alone. Again, over a period of some 25 years, he sought to demonstrate that associational behaviours have declined in the USA with adverse effects upon a range of outcomes from the economic to the social.
Most academic commentators locate the antecedents of these recent writings in the earlier works of Pierre Bourdieu and James Coleman (see Schuller, Baron and Field 2000) . For Bourdieu (1991) , social capital was one of several guises of capital -the others being economic, cultural and symbolic capital -which serve to constitute the social position of a person; in this schema, capital can be seen as comprising power and resources. For Coleman (1994) , social capital was a set of resources within family relationships and community social organisation that complemented human capital and supported educational achievement. Although it has generated much debate and criticism, Schuller et.al. (op.cit.) conclude that, despite its untidiness, social capital as a concept has much promise and heuristic value. Two of its key merits, in their view, are that "it shifts the focus of analysis from the behaviour of individual agents to the pattern of relations between agents, social units and institutions" (p.35) and that it acts as a link between micro-, meso-and macro-levels of analysis, or between the actions of individuals and groups and social structural events. This is similar to the criticism made of area-based regeneration initiatives to combat social exclusion, namely that there needs to be greater policy integration at local and national levels, and vertical linkages from neighbourhood renewal programmes to regional economic strategies and national mainstream programmes (Parkinson 1998 
Components and Types of Social Capital
Social capital is something useful that exists between people, and we may be interested in the social capital that is available to individuals, or in the levels of social capital that exist at an aggregate scale within communities. The three components of social capital most often referred to are: the social networks used by people; the social norms adhered to in people's behaviour, and in particular whether these norms are widely shared; and the levels of trust people have either in their neighbours, in people in general, or in the institutions of government.
"features of social life -networks, norms and trust -that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives…Social capital, in short, refers to social connections and the attendant norms and trust" (Putnam 1995) "features of social organisation, such as civic participation, norms of reciprocity and trust in others, that facilitate cooperation for mutual benefit" (Kawachi et.al. 1997) "defined simply as a set of informal values or norms shared among members of a group that permits cooperation among them. If members of the group come to expect that others will behave reliably and honestly, then they will come to trust one another. Trust is like a lubricant that makes the running of any group or organisation more efficient" (Fukuyama 1999) "the networks, norms and relationships that help communities and organisations work more effectively" (MacGillivray 2002) "the institutions, relationships and norms that shape the quality and quantity of a society's social interactions" (World Bank web-site) The relationship between the three main components of social capital is unclear, and the role of trust especially difficult to understand. Do networks generate trust or do you need trust to begin to participate in networks? Are norms observable and thus able to foster a sense of trust? Can norms develop through networks that do not involve face-to-face interaction? Putnam talks of 'vicious spirals' and 'virtuous circles' between trust and civic participation, since our expectations of others' trustworthiness will affect our own trustworthiness and behaviour. Schuller et.al. (2000) argue that Putnam has shifted his interest away from trust towards reciprocity, though they also summarise his view thus: "But overall, trustworthiness 'lubricates social life'. It promotes the kinds of interaction which reinforce norms of generalised r eciprocity. This generalised reciprocity is the touchstone of social capital." (p.11) Social capital can be examined in terms of individuals or groups. De Souza Briggs sees social capital as of individual utility and he distinguishes two forms of social capital. Social support or coping capital enables one to 'get by' and is especially important to the poor and may be emotional or material -e.g. getting a loan or a lift.
Components
Social leverage is that social capital that helps one 'get ahead' through access to influence or opportunity. Commentators have observed that poor communities have more coping than levering social capital. Lang and Hornburg (1998) illustrate the group perspective on social capital. For them, social glue refers to the extent to which people take part in group activities, with a recursive relationship between this participation and trust: trust influences joining a group and participation in the group builds trust. Social bridges are the vital links between groups which connect groups together and give them access to wider chains of affiliation.
These two perspectives on social capital, the individual and the group angle, bring us to the third column of Box 3, which shows the three scales at which, and the modus operandi through which, social capital may operate. Bonding capital is akin to strong social ties between like individuals (e.g. family members or an ethnic grouping), often located in the same neighbourhood, which enable people to 'get by'. Bridging capital on the other hand, consists of weaker, less dense, cross-cutting, weaker social ties (see Granovetter 1973; Henning and Leinberg 1996) between heterogenous individuals such as friends from different groups, friends of friends, business associates, which enable people to 'get on '. Aldrige et.al. (2002) give these two forms of social capital the distinguishing labels, social glue and social oil , respectively. Lastly, Linking capital, attributed by Aldrige et.al. (ibid.) to Woolcock (2001) , refers to vertical rather than horizontal connections, such as relations between the powerful and the less powerful, the political elite and the public, or between social classes.
Community Capital
Within a regeneration context, the social capital that deprived communities need in order to attain a better future also comprises that between local community organisations and partnerships (see Hibbitt et.al. 2001) : organisational networks among a plethora of groups and bodies; norms of working practice; and, crucially, trust in each other, given that they are pursuing related but different objectives. There is a need to focus upon what Temkin and Rohe (1998) term the 'institutional infrastructure' within local neighbourhoods and to assess the level and quality of relations between formal organisations in the neighbourhood and the actual ability of these groups to act on behalf of residents, or the extent to which co-operation is institutionalised (Boix and Posner, 1998) . Neighbourhood organisations, for Temkin and Rohe, provide an important bridge between residents and policy-makers; their networks and linkages in wider arenas -community capital for short -have to be studied alongside a study of social relations between individuals in order to fully explore a community's social capital. The relevance of community capital to the social capital and regeneration agenda is set out in Box 4.
Box 4 The Advantages of Community Capital
The Audit Commission makes the point that an area's past experience and its regeneration inheritance will influence how well placed the area is to tackle today's issues, and that a key element of this inheritance is having "a well-established 'local institutional infrastructure' [which] ensures effective communication and cooperation" (2002, p.19) . They go on to say, however, that in situations where past regeneration has produced conflict and disappointment, local groups and institutions will need time to build trust and mutual understanding.
Social Capital and Power
A point made most strongly by DeFilippis (2001) is that social capital is about power relations, comprising a variety of realms and social interactions, as Bourdieu (1985) put it. For Bourdieu, capital -of which social capital is one form -is almost synonymous with power: "Bourdieu's notion of capital…entails the capacity to exercise control over one's own future and that of others. As such it is a form of power" (Postone et.al., 1993, p.4) . The reality is that democracy depends upon struggle and conflict more than on the comfortable 'civicness' expounded by the proponents of social capital (Foweraker and Landman 1997) . Civil society generates unequal power relations and has a tendency to oligarchy (Alexander 1998 , quoted in Taylor 2000 .
Whilst social capital exists in the relationships between individuals (Routledge and Amsberg, 1996), social capital is also defined as the ability of people to work together in groups and organisations (Fukuyama, 1995) .
DeFilippis observes that it is groups
An individual member of a community group may broker a link to another organisation. Furthermore, an organisation with diverse membership may be disproportionately network-rich in this way.
Organisational networks may help connect people on an individual basis.
An individual's power within wider decision-making arenas is enhanced if s/he represents a community group within representative politics.
Community organisations have access to resources which can be deployed to support collective actions and social activities to generate social capital.
In the context of regeneration partnership working, community organisations offer access to institutional networks.
of people who wield power and maintain control. His examples of how communities have managed to alter their access to power all involve local community organisations rather than more informally connected individuals.
Putnam is criticised because "social capital becomes divorced from capital (in the literal economic sense), stripped of power relations, and imbued with the assumption that social networks are win-win relationships and that individual gains, interests and profits are synonymous with group gains, interests and profits" (DeFillippis 2001, p.800). DeFillippis argues that social networks are often confused with the ability to generate and control capital. Inner city neighbourhoods possess social networks and community organisations but lack power, and they are unlikely to ge t that power from community development programmes that simply concentrate on voluntary associations as win-win relationships with no interest in conflict, only in 'civic virtue'.
Social Capital and Context
Social capital is dependent upon context. Fine (2001) states that both the meaning and the distribution of social capital have been said to be context specific, whilst Foley and Edwards (1999) point out that how social capital is produced, its 'use value' and 'liquidity' or 'portability' depend upon the specifics of context. The argue that the potential for utilising social capital as a means of securing more effective policy delivery may be severely limited in many contexts, and that there is little evidence to suggest that general trust explains the quality and effectiveness of policy delivery.
The political context clearly matters. Networks have to be analysed within the context of underlying collective action problems and the prevailing political and institutional arrangements of which they are a part (Pennington and Rydin 2000) . Political structures and institutions shape the context of associational activity: "the governance of an area is affected by social capital, but is itself an influence on social capital" (Maloney et al., 1999; . Local governance, through a city's political opportunity structure (see Eisinger 1973 and Tarrow 1994) affects the distribution of social capital, for such a structure provides incentives, expectations and openings for people to undertake collective action within the political system.
The Downside of Social Capital
For some observers, social capital is too 'cosy' a concept (see Taylor and 'outsiders'. Reflecting these polarities, many of the disadvantages and misuses of social capital are discussed by Portes and Landolt (1998) and by Aldridge et.al. (2002) , and are set out in Box 5.
Firstly, economic performance can be undermined by associational memberships such as trade unions and chambers of commerce pursuing sectional interests which are inefficient. Secondly, the 'old boy networks' of the middle-classes help to maintain social class barriers and inhibit social inclusion across groups. The inherent advantages of the more extensive and diverse social networks of advantaged social groups can exacerbate inequality: this is social capital as a 'club good' rather than as a 'public good', as is often assumed.
Conversely, the strong bonding social capital of poorer groups can have disadvantages which limit advancement. In some pla ces and societies, bonding social capital within groups far exceeds bridging social capital between groups, and is put to use for tribal and conflictual purposes. Some groups which have both strong bonding social capital and are geographically concentrated, such as ethnic minorities in many cities, may become insular and disconnected both by desire and by default. Similarly, strong communities can be oppressive and seek conformity among their members, restricting routes out of poverty and exclusion. Lastly, social capital, through networks and norms, can be used to promote negative behaviours such as crime, truancy and drugtaking, thus damaging community welfare, health and education.
Box 5 The Downsides of Social Capital
The Great Unknown
Social capital can thus be viewed positively and negatively, though more often the former rather than the latter. But despite the tremendous interest that the concept has generated in recent years, even its strongest supporters admit that there is much that we still don't know about it. Putnam (1998) identified several key areas where more understanding was required: to know more about how social capital works at a microlevel, for example in relation to education and health; to be able to better distinguish different forms of social capital and their associated benefits; to know how social capital operates across different cultural settings; and to understand the processes by which social capital is created, with the observable outcome that the social-capitalrich get richer and the poor get poorer "because social capital runs in virtuous circles and vicious cycles" (p.vii).
Notwithstanding both the downsides of social capital and our limited understanding of it, the Labour Government has firmly nailed its flag to the social capital mast in the battle against social exclusion. Our next task is to see how social capital has featured in recent regeneration and urban policy.
Social Capital, Regeneration and Urban Policy

Neighbourhood Renewal
The Social Exclusion Unit (SEU) produced its first report on neighbourhood renewal in September 1998, constituting an interim statement in the process of producing a national strategy for neighbourhood renewal. The main themes outlined in relation to Sectional interests undermine economic performance.
Old-boy networks inhibit social mobility.
Strongly bonded social groups may exacerbate community conflicts.
Strongly bonded and spatially concentrated groups can become insular.
Social capital can be used to promote damaging behaviours.
Strong communities can be oppressive and comformist.
poor communities were: improving the skills base and overcoming barriers to employment; improving housing and neighbourhood management; improving access to public and private services; and giving better opportunities and motivation to young people. References to the community were relation to community involvement in the regeneration process (SEU 1998, p.40) , with an acknowledgement that maximising the community's contribution would entail "capacity building" (p.57). The report made no explicit reference to social capital.
By the time the SEU's consultation paper on neighbourhood renewal was published, the concept of social capital was much more prominent. The Prime Minister in his introduction to the document states that one of four imperatives is "to revive and empower the community" (SEU 2000, p.5) and this is later expounded to include two dimensions, namely removing local threats to the community such as anti-social behaviour and then "to build community confidence and encourage residents to help themselves" (p.10). The document argues that reduced social capital, due to increased fear of crime and rapid population turnover in deprived neighbourhoods, is "a key factor in decline" and that "social stability and a community's ability to help itself" are built upon the "vital resources of 'social capital' " (p.24).
The "Reviving Communities" theme which follows in the document is very close to a social capital agenda. As well as requiring resident consultation and a local management presence, well-functioning communities also involve (p.53): a broad social mix; an agreed set of rules among residents which are consistently applied; and places and facilities where people can interact, with particular mention of the role of shops and community venues.
Linked to the aim of rebuilding social capital is strong advocacy for volunteering:
"It often brings people into contact with those outside their normal circle, broadening horizons and raising expectations, and can link people into informal networks through which work is more easily found" (SEU 2000, p.53).
Closely related is a major theme of promoting self-help in deprived areas. The steps which flow from this aim are to build skills and confidence (capacity building) and provide funding for voluntary and community groups so that residents "take independent action to improve things" and have "opportunities for more direct The means to achieve some of this is what is termed "community learning and development" (part of the community development component missing from the draft strategy in England) comprising "informal learning programmes and community action based on real issues in people's day to day lives" (p.9), so that individuals and communities improve their confidence, motivation and sense of power and influence.
The social capital -related goals of skills, resources and networks may boost confidence and thus help address the problems of failure, inferiority, low self-esteem and powerlessness in poor communities, as manifest in apathy, withdrawal, depression and aggression (Wilkinson 1994 ).
However, as Wood (2000) points out, this social capital agenda is not in itself enough to both overcome exclusion and empower communities as the Government wishes.
The latter also involves challenging the power relationships between professionals and residents, with cultural changes required in regeneration agencies, local authorities and bodies which fund regeneration ( 
Box 6 Domains of Social Cohesion
Source: Forrest and Kearns (2001) The Review Team's approach is summed up in the following extract:
"Community cohesion is about helping micro-communities to gel or mesh into an integrated whole. These divided communities would need to develop common goals and a shared vision. This would seem to imply that such groups should occupy a common sense of place as well. The high levels of residential segregation found in Domain Description Common values and a civic culture Common aims and objectives. many English towns would make it difficult to achieve community cohesion." (Home Office 2001b, p.70.
The report then urges the adoption of creative strategies to produce more mixed housing areas. The subsequent draft guidance to local authorities on community cohesion specified that strong and positive relations should be developed between people from different backgrounds in three key locations: in the workplace, in schools and within neighbourhoods (Local Government Association et.al. 2002) .
Box 7 The Contribution of Social Capital to Community Cohesion
Source: Home Office (2001b)
But not everyone is convinced by the Government's approach. Amin (2002) in particular is sceptical as to whether the Government's agenda is realisable and has two key reservations. Firstly, he is pessimistic that public spaces in general or housing estates in particular can generate inter-cultural or inter-ethnic dialogue and understanding because the marginalised and prejudiced tend to stay away, and because habitual contact does not necessarily require the dropping of fixed identities and relations and the adoption of cultural displacement and transgression. Secondly, he argues more for what he terms an 'agonistic politics' from which new attitudes and identities can arise, rather than "the naïve pursuit of a unitary sense of place" (p.14).
In his view: rooted in common values,, a shared sense of place and local networks of trust -can become the basis of living with difference in such neighbourhoods." (p.14)
Nonetheless, the Government sees the National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal as a means of pursuing the community cohesion age nda in deprived and divided communities. The Ministerial Group charged the Neighbourhood Renewal Unit with the task to "make community cohesion a central objective of all its programmes" (Home Office 2001a, p.32) and to "use all available opportunities to promote crosscommunity and cross-cultural experience" (ibid.). This will involve, among other things, building community networks to help resolve community conflicts and include excluded groups. Thus, by this means, social capital and social cohesion serve as an important link between regeneration and urban policy.
Government Interest in Social Capital
Having seen that social capital appears in several places in the Government's regeneration and urban policies we might well ask why this is so? Why has the Government hit upon social capital as an important element of the solution to
Britain's urban problems? Here we can suggest a number of reasons, some of them ideological and others more utilitarian.
Treading an Independent Path
There are two senses in which the centrality of social capital to urban and regeneration policies enables the Government to tread an independent path to social progress. The first is to avoid the alleged destiny of the United States of America, that of seeing the decline of associational activity and social capital as first reported by Putnam (1995) . Although Britain has a 'special relationship' with the USA, something played up by recent British Prime Ministers, the sense of common destiny which Churchill believed to exist during war time (see Paxman 1998, p.39) would not find such favour today, especially in social terms. Sassen (2000) talks of 'recovering the place' of the city in an era of economic globalisation. Similarly, the British wish to save their society from American cultural imperialism (if they can) and pride themselves on the fact that the social divisions and problems evident in American cities shall not be manifest to anything like the same extent in the UK. Thus, if
America is suffering a loss of social capital, then we, the British, shall do all we can to shore-up social capital, especially in our poorest neighbourhoods. In line with the view of the Americans that "They've got all the money, but we've got the brains", the Government would claim that it saw the social capital problem coming and was clever enough to head it off at the pass.
The Government may actually be fortunate in having this window of opportunity, since Hall's review of levels of social capital in Britain, using aggregate measures of associational membership and generalised trust, concluded:
"The balance of the evidence seems to indicate, however, that aggregate levels of social capital have not declined to an appreciable extent in Britain over the post-war years" (Hall 1999, p.457 ).
Hall makes two qualifications to this conclusion. Firstly, that levels of generalised trust do seem to have fallen, especially among the young. And secondly, that the character of organisational involvements may have changed, even if the levels of activity haven't, so that involvement is less intense and face-to-face and less geared to public interest organisations.
The second way in which the social capital agenda serves to highlight the Government's particular approach to urban policy is in its contrast with the years of Conservative rule during the 1980s and 1990s. More than anything else, social capital's place within regeneration policy signals that New Labour's approach to development differs from Mrs. Thatcher's view that "There is no such thing as society" and from the Conservative's property-led regeneration policies (see Oatley 1998). Although there is a strong element of tackling worklessness within national programmes for labour market inclusion, New Labour's policies also have a softer, community-focused edge and a bottom-up rather than a top-down rhetoric to them.
Third-Way Politics
The crucial role attributed to social capital in the regeneration of deprived areas and in the building of community cohesion in British cities fits nicely with New Labour's socalled 'Third Way' politics. This, according to Giddens (2000) , is about steering a middle course between highly statist policies and neo-liberal free-market policies. It seeks to combine the state and the market whilst minimising their disadvantages and opening up new territory for intervention (Taylor 2002, p.108) . Thus, rather than either leaving neighbourhoods to the operations and effects of property and labour markets, or intervening as a nanny-state to shore up failing enterprises in depressed regions, Third Way politics supports the notion that self-help activities undertaken within existing market and governmental structures is the way forward for disadvantaged groups and communities. The Government's role is to remove the barriers to self-help, be they lack of skills or fear of crime. Of course, this approach avoids the issues of structural inequalities and redistribution of power and resources since the ethos is to 'help others to help themselves'. It is as if anyone and everyone can be creative and achieve success, given the opportunity. Those who object to the authoritarian overtones of the communitarian approach to Third Way policies, nevertheless offer a creative and optimistic alternative that markets and communities, financial and social capital, "should be harnessed" to "make us better off, put us more in charge of our lives and make us better able to look after ourselves" through creating, advancing and spreading knowledge (Leadbeater 1999, p.16) . The Government should help communities to "harness" social capital resources, but it doesn't have to (re) distribute resources.
This path is important to any government which wishes to occupy the middle ground in politics. For as Hirst points out, associationalism -the freedom and necessity for individuals to associate in order to achieve their needs and aspirations -which might sound collectivist, "is justified on essentially individualistic terms, that it both enhances the freedom and the individuatio n of the individual" and is achieved more effectively by co-operative action (Hirst 1994, p.50) . New Labour can claim that its social capital agenda is about both individual and collective freedoms and also concerned with social solidarity: it has both right-wing and left-wing dimensions to it. Richards and Smith (2002) argue that the Third Way allows New Labour to move away from the post-war Keynesian welfare state and retain some of the mechanisms of intervention introduced by the Conservatives, e.g. deregulation, privatisation and the creation of public agencies. Rather than rely upon state intervention, the Third Way involves greater use of the private, voluntary and community sectors in the delivery of services and the creation of partnerships and networks based on trust between the state, businesses, voluntary and public sectors. Not only does the role of the state change, but so too does the role of the citizen, with a much stronger emphasis in Third-Way or stakeholder politics upon the "respons ible and responsive individual -the notion of the developmental self, and the idea that through help and education people can improve" (p.237).
It is clear how the language of social capital chimes with the philosophy of Third Way politics. What is more, since social capital is a resource, and social inclusion policy aims to foster individual, family and community assets (financial, psychological, social and cultural) (Oppenheim 1998) , the Government can be seen to be having a positive impact, giving communities a 'leg-up', simply by enabling them to realise their social capital resources. Having made the error of referring to disadvantaged areas as 'worst estates' (SEU 1998), the Government now wishes to be positive about all neighbourhoods and communities since they can all be said to have potential in the form of unrealised social capital resources. The language of 'realising social capital assets' is much more in-tune with New Labour's spin on deprivation than its earlier 'combating social exclusion' agenda. Furthermore, compared with eradicating social exclusion, social capital is a more nebulous target which is even less easy to measure, thereby making it more difficult for critics to hold the government to account for inadequate progress.
Joined Up Policy
One of the major aims of the Blair Governments has been to reform central government, in particular so that broad government strategy can be achieved rather than be thwarted by departmentalism. State reform has been in the form of 'joined-up government' or Modernizing Government as Labour's White Paper of 1999 was known. Reforms were put in place to deliver a co-ordinated policy programme, including the creation of new co-ordinating units at the centre of government, such as the Social Exclusion Unit. Richards and Smith (2002) explain that the components of joined-up government include the creation of joined-up delivery units, new budgets that cross-cut departments, cross-cutting reviews of policy and a greater focus on outcomes (p.241).
Social capital contributes to the joined-up policy agenda in two main ways. Firstly, it provides central government with a cross-departmental outcome measure that can be thought of as strategic and holistic. Social capital is not the property or goal of one single government department but is an archetypal cross-cutting goal. Of course social capital is an interim goal, a means to the end of empowerment etc., but these end goals can easily be ignored if progress on the interim goal, social capital, can be demonstrated. A neat trick for government.
Secondly, social capital is a phenomenon that individual government departments can adopt as an objective and as a result the government can achieve a situation where different officials and ministers are 'singing from the same hymn sheet'. It overcomes the pre-existing problem that certain actions, often preventative ones, are 
Multiple Outcomes from Social Capital
A major attraction of social capital to the Government and policy-makers is that it promises multiple social outcomes, as indicated in Box 8. Social theory and research indicate that social capital may result in positive outcomes in the fields of crime, health, employment, education and democracy. We shall briefly consider these in turn, drawing on the summaries provided by Kawachi and Berkman (2000) and Aldridge et.al. (2002) . 
Box 8 The Outcomes of Social Capital
Crime
In relation to crime, theories of informal social control (Shaw and Mackay 1942) and 'collective efficacy' (Sampson et.al. 1997 ) view communities as social organisations with complex social networks and socialisation processes which influence their ability to control youth and criminal activities. Perceptions of neighbourhood cohesion, trust and expectations that neighbours would exercise informal control over others have been related to levels of violent crime and property crime both within particular cities (Sampson et.al. 1997 ) and across states (Kennedy et.al. 1998; Kawachi et.al. 1999 ). Social capital is interpreted as a community resource which is associated with better socialisation and collective norms (e.g. lower self-interest), the supervision of leisure and youth activities, a willingness to intervene to prevent truancy and antisocial behaviour, and more effective community sanctions against transgressors, such as shaming.
Health
Health is another area where social capital analysts have been very active. Studies have sho wn relationships between various social capital measures (such as density of civic associational membership, levels of distrust and perceptions of generalised reciprocity) and health outcomes including age-adjusted mortality and self-rated health (Kawachi et.al. 1997; . Three sets of links between social capital and health are posited in the literature (see Kawachi and Berkman 2000) . Firstly, social capital may influence health behaviours, either by spreading health information quickly through a community, increasing the adoption of healthy norms, or acting as a break on health-damaging behaviours (e.g. smoking, drug-taking, crime) -of course, one could also argue that social capital may fuel health-damaging behaviours! Secondly, communities with strong social capital may obtain better access to health services and other local amenities due to collective lobbying behaviour for services and better tactics to avoid any reductions in local services. Thirdly, social capital, especially in the form of bonding relationships, may impact upon psycho-social processes in a number of ways which have health benefits: as a source of self-esteem and mutual respect (Wilkinson 1996) ; boosting feelings of safety and a trusting environment; providing social support and care, which in turn produces a sense of well-being and belonging; reducing social isolation and its effects upon ill health; improving the functioning of the human immune system through emotional support, and confiding opportunities (Kennedy et.al. 1990 ).
Health is an area where mainstream policies dovetail nicely with the concerns of regeneration policy (see Russell and Killoran 2000) . This ought not to be surprising given that a recent review concluded that:
"…neighbourhood conditions do appear to matter…across a broad range of outcomes.
We find the strongest evidence for the independent effect of neighbourhood on overall mortality. There is also reasonably sound evidence that neighbourhoods…shape health-related behaviours and mental health" (Gould-Ellen et.al. 2001, p.404) The Government has adopted a social model of health which explicitly acknowledges the influences of lifestyles and the social environment upon health outcomes (Department of Health 1998) . Indeed, reminiscent of the langua ge of social exclusion is the Government's report on health inequalities which talks of 'upstream policies', consisting of non-health interventions, having a wide range of benefits including benefits to health (Acheson 1998) . Subsequently, the Health Development Agency commenced a programme of research into the links between social capital and health in order to see how social capital could be used "to support participatory approaches to health improvement in practice (Swann and Morgan 2002, p.5) . The l ink to regeneration is very close, and one of the Government's Health Action Zones has produced a guide to health impact assessment which views regeneration as something which aims "to change the resources at people's disposal and the conditions in which people live" (Cave and Curtis 2001, vol. III, p.11) and which identifies social capital as one of four key aspects of regeneration programmes which influence health.
Employment
Social capital turns the focus from financial poverty to 'network poverty' with areas of concentrated poverty said to be lacking the network of weak ties which provide access to information and opportunities about jobs (6, 1997) . The thesis is that the labour market works as much through informal networks as through formal institut ions, and that relying solely on the latter is insufficient. The Government's Performance and Innovation Unit (Aldridge et.al. 2002) quote research to show that in the USA, racial differences in employment outcomes depend largely on the fact that whites much moreso than blacks use their social capital, in the form of personal networks, to find out about employment opportunities (Petersen et.al. 2000) . In the UK, meanwhile, ethnic minority groups report a lack of social connectedness as a barrier to career advancement. Whilst quantitative research based on British longitudinal data has found that individuals' employment expectations, the probability of someone starting a job, and the chances of leaving poverty are all lower in deprived areas, after controlling for the individual's characteristics (Buck 2001) , the area effects upon employment are modest. Moreover, the research does not identify social capital as the area characteristic which most influences outcomes.
Education
It is clear that the Government believes that educational attainment depends upon factors beyond the skills of teachers, including in particular the ethos of the school and the attitudes of parents. Social capital is a way of linking these two factors, since a lot depends upon aspirations which in turn are communicated through social networks (Aldridge et.al. 2002) . In the field of education, the links between social capital and relevant outcomes are more nebulous and less clearly specified, though the connection between social capital and human capital was a main concern of one of the most prominent writers on social capital (Coleman 1988 ).
By considering those factors which have been identified in educational research as impacting upon educational outcomes (see Sparkes and Glennerster 2002), we can identify the role which social capital might play in relation to performance at school and adult outcomes. Social capital, through its norms and role in informal social control (see above), may help reduce truancy levels, which have been shown to be related to lower status jobs, less stable careers, unemployment, marital breakdown and heavy smoking in adult life. Labour market success is also related to the acquisition of soft skills many of which may be acquired through social networks, such as friendliness, teamwork, spoken communication, and enthusiasm.
Social capital and the role of parents is also crucial to school performance. High levels of trust and contact between parents and the school are associated with better outcomes, and of course it may be the case that trust in the school is linked to general trust in institutions. The parents' role as educators has been shown to be important to outcomes in the early stages of schooling, yet a lack of confidence, knowledge and guidance inhibits parents taking part in learning activities with their children. This barrier could be overcome through social networks with capable parents who then disseminate information about their own approaches to home learning. Lastly, the home environment is important to pupils becoming good learners, in particular in terms of its organisational dimensions and levels of encouragement: peer pressures and social capital which emphasises home learning may boost the perceived role of the home in this regard.
The Functioning of Democracy
The social capital agenda is part and parcel of the New Labour Government's aim to achieve 'democratic renewal', creating a symbiotic relationship between effective government and interested, self-supporting and law abiding citizens. Putnam (1993) advanced this line of argument in his study of regional government in Italy, where he stated that "the more civic the context, the better the government" (p.182) with government performance measured in terms of effectiveness, efficiency and levels of citizen satisfaction. He ended his book with the line: "Building social capital will not be easy, but it is the key to making democracy work" (p.185). More recently, the democratic renewal agenda in the UK has broadened to include voter turnout as well as government effectiveness. Falling participation rates in local and national elections undermines the government's legitimacy, and thus evidence that civic trust and group membership rates are related to voter turnout (Kawachi a nd Berkman 2000) strengthen the government's interest in social capital.
Thus, the New Labour Government believes that social capital is the key to effective democracy and we can identify a number of mechanisms by which this is held to be so. Firstly, as stated above, local levels of trust and group involvements seem to influence turnout in national elections, so that developing social capital may have spin-offs for civic engagement and government legitimacy. Secondly, citizens with social capital resour ces are better organised, better informed about how government works, and more able to convey their needs to government, so that public services better meet their needs, and they can put pressure on governments to allocate resources to them. Thirdly, citizens are more civic minded, more co-operative and more law-abiding if they possess social capital, with the result that government finds it easier to implement policies in this context. Lastly, civic engagement at the local level and involvement in voluntary associations can act as a training and recruiting ground for local and national politics, enhancing political interest and the capability of politicians.
Conclusion
We have seen that social capital features prominently in New Labour's approach to regeneration and urban policy. This is for a number of reasons, both practical and ideological, including most importantly its role in unifying Government policy and making a link between the urban/regeneration policy field and the Government's wider agenda to modernise the way government works and renew British democracy.
In this sense, social capital can be viewed as a good thing, demonstrating more creativity on the part of policy-makers and integrating urban/regeneration policy with other policy areas. This begs the question (not answered here) of whether social capital has influenced urban and regeneration practice as well as policy.
On the other hand, there are dangers in the social capital approach which should be recognised. Firstly, Government ought to be wary of being seduced by its own policy and linguistic creativity. The emphasis upon 'soft goals' such as social capital and self-esteem may not be enough to satisfy the electorate, who still want greater financial security and better pub lic service performance, which social capital is at some removes from delivering.
Secondly, there are drawbacks in the prominent role given to citizen responsibility and self-help as part and parcel of the social capital agenda. If better outcomes are not secured for poor communities, it may be possible for the Government to lay the blame partly (or largely) at the door of the communities themselves, on the grounds that the conditions for greater co-operative behaviour, networking etc., were put in place but these were not taken advantage of. Furthermore, a crucial weakness is the assumed correspondence between 'community empowerment' in terms of the realisation of social capital resources, and the bigger issue of power in terms of control over one's own destiny and influence over others. The social capital approach to neighbourhood renewal risks failing to make the connections between deprived areas and the operation of wider governance structures within urban regions. An analysis of power relations would have to entail scrutiny of the political opportunity structures in place within districts and regions, and the context-specific nature of trust in governance.
Thirdly, whilst social capital has contributed to some deeper thinking about the nature of community cohesion within urban Britain, notably following ethnic tensions in medium-sized towns, it is also clear that some of the proposals which have emerged from this consideration are under-explored.
The prescription that community cohesion should entail a unified, shared sense of place, a set of common values and a reduction in segregation of residence and institutions between ethnic groups, may not necessarily be essential. The extent to which these social reformulations are required, or the degree to which tolerant communities can be constructed without them, is open to question. But this is a set of issues that requires further consideration of the nature of identity and of the role of the public sphere in contemporary British society.
Unfortunately, the social capital perspective tends to hide these issues behind its somewhat nostalgic civicness.
Lastly, social capital may be somewhat disabling as a central element of Government policy because it is so amenable to New Labour 'spin'. In the face of some degree of overarching success in boosting measured levels of social capital, it is possible that policy-makers may convince themselves that social conditions have improved when in fact society may not be quite as civic, harmonious, tolerant and collaborative as social capital indicators tell us. A reliance upon aggregate, cross-sectional measures of social capital (such as contained in the General Household Survey) is insufficiently informative about the nature of social processes and the quality of social relations at different spatial scales.
Government must remember that social capital, like other forms of capital, is only beneficial if it can be put to good use. Social capital is not an end in itself, rather it is a resource which individuals and communities must have the opportunity to use.
Thus, the political, economic and spatial structures of cities remain as important as ever, and any evaluation of policy should consider what communities have managed to achieve as a result of higher levels of social capital and how citizens quality of life has been improved through social capital.
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